Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government
The extensive literature on the size and growth of government attests to the long-standing interest of social scientists in the interrelations of economic development, income distribution, political processes, bureaucracy, and tax rates. Recent surveys of parts of this literature (Peacock, 1979; Cam...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 1983-01, Vol.41 (3), p.403-418 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Meltzer, Allan H. Richard, Scott F. |
| description | The extensive literature on the size and growth of government attests to the long-standing interest of social scientists in the interrelations of economic development, income distribution, political processes, bureaucracy, and tax rates. Recent surveys of parts of this literature (Peacock, 1979; Cameron, 1978; and Larkey, Stolp and Winer, 1981) show that neither theoretical nor empirical work has resolved the main issues. (See also Peltzman, 1980.) There is little agreement about a common model or framework for predicting the size of government or discussing the causes of government growth or decline. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF00141072 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 1983-01, Vol.41 (3), p.403-418 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_61132360 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Aggregate income Budgets Consumption Disposable income ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Equilibrium Government Government bureaucracy Government spending Income distribution Income redistribution Income shares Income taxes Leisure Median income NATIONAL GOVERNMENT Organization Per capita POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OR POLITICAL DEGENERATION POLITICAL THEORY Politics Productivity Tax rates Taxes Theory Utility functions Voters Voting rights |
| title | Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government |
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