Representative versus Direct Democracy: A Tiebout Test of Relative Performance: Comment
In a recent paper, Santerre (1986) set out to investigate the overall relative performance between representative and direct forms of local government by studying how the alternative forms of municipal governance capitalize on the average per acre price of land within a Tiebout world. His hypothesis...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 1988-01, Vol.56 (1), p.69-72 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Deller, Steven C. Chicoine, David L. |
| description | In a recent paper, Santerre (1986) set out to investigate the overall relative performance between representative and direct forms of local government by studying how the alternative forms of municipal governance capitalize on the average per acre price of land within a Tiebout world. His hypothesis is that voters prefer to locate in a direct democracy, opposed to a representative democracy because of more voter control. Operating on these preferences, voters drive property values higher within the jurisdiction governed by direct democracy. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF00052071 |
| format | Article |
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His hypothesis is that voters prefer to locate in a direct democracy, opposed to a representative democracy because of more voter control. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 1988-01, Vol.56 (1), p.69-72 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_61122680 |
| source | EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Business Source Complete (EBSCO); JSTOR All Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerLink |
| subjects | Allocative efficiency Bureaucrats CITIES, TOWNS, VILLAGES Coefficients COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENTS Consumers Democracy Direct democracy Economics Efficiency Evaluation Expenditures Government bureaucracy Government spending Hypotheses Jurisdiction LOCAL GOVERNMENT Median voter model POLITICAL AND POWER PROCESS POLITICAL THEORY Property value Property values Public economics Public good Public goods Public sector Voters |
| title | Representative versus Direct Democracy: A Tiebout Test of Relative Performance: Comment |
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