Strategic Voting in the 1996 Japanese General Election
Japan's new electoral system may or may not be good for Japanese democracy, but it is almost ideally designed for the study of strategic voting. No other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single-member districts (SMD) and...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Comparative political studies 1999-04, Vol.32 (2), p.257-270 |
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| container_title | Comparative political studies |
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| creator | REED, STEVEN R. |
| description | Japan's new electoral system may or may not be good for Japanese democracy, but it is almost ideally designed for the study of strategic voting. No other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) votes. Using candidate-level aggregate data, I find strong evidence for strategic voting: Candidates with a good chance of winning receive more SMD than PR votes, and those with little chance of winning receive more PR votes. Strategic voting explains not only the basic pattern but also several exceptions to the rule. In addition, I find that a realistic but relatively inaccurate ex ante prediction of a candidate's probability of victory produces a superior explanatory model than does a perfect ex post prediction calculated from the final electoral results. These results support the hypothesis that voters base their strategic voting calculations on simple cues available to them before the election. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0010414099032002004 |
| format | Article |
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No other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) votes. Using candidate-level aggregate data, I find strong evidence for strategic voting: Candidates with a good chance of winning receive more SMD than PR votes, and those with little chance of winning receive more PR votes. Strategic voting explains not only the basic pattern but also several exceptions to the rule. In addition, I find that a realistic but relatively inaccurate ex ante prediction of a candidate's probability of victory produces a superior explanatory model than does a perfect ex post prediction calculated from the final electoral results. These results support the hypothesis that voters base their strategic voting calculations on simple cues available to them before the election.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0010-4140</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1552-3829</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/0010414099032002004</identifier><identifier>CODEN: CPLSBZ</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications</publisher><subject>Citizen participation ; Comparative politics ; Democracy ; Elections ; Electoral systems ; Government and politics ; Japan ; Political participation ; Political sociology ; Proportional representation ; Single-member constituencies ; Strategy ; Voter behavior ; Voting ; Voting behaviour</subject><ispartof>Comparative political studies, 1999-04, Vol.32 (2), p.257-270</ispartof><rights>Copyright Sage Publications, Inc. 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These results support the hypothesis that voters base their strategic voting calculations on simple cues available to them before the election.</description><subject>Citizen participation</subject><subject>Comparative politics</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Elections</subject><subject>Electoral systems</subject><subject>Government and politics</subject><subject>Japan</subject><subject>Political participation</subject><subject>Political sociology</subject><subject>Proportional representation</subject><subject>Single-member constituencies</subject><subject>Strategy</subject><subject>Voter behavior</subject><subject>Voting</subject><subject>Voting behaviour</subject><issn>0010-4140</issn><issn>1552-3829</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1999</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkU1Lw0AQhhdRsFZ_gZfgwVt09ntzlFKrUvDgx3XZ3WxqSprU3fTgv3djBEHEDgPDwPMO78wgdI7hCmMprwEwMMygKIASgJTsAE0w5ySnihSHaDIQ-YAco5MY16klnKgJEk99ML1f1S577fq6XWV1m_VvPsNFIbIHszWtjz5b-NYH02Tzxru-7tpTdFSZJvqz7zpFL7fz59ldvnxc3M9ulrljkvW5lJaXpTSOKc4rpkTBqQBeCYtLQom0ijlbygqwxUxWZUlVWVFmnSOKWS7oFF2Oc7ehe9_52OtNHZ1vmmSr20UtMCaEEbwX5Ok0CiTsBamSg0WSwItf4LrbhTZtqwmIrygSREfIhS7G4Cu9DfXGhA-NQQ-v0X-8JqlgVEWz8j9j_5N8AseAiog</recordid><startdate>19990401</startdate><enddate>19990401</enddate><creator>REED, STEVEN R.</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19990401</creationdate><title>Strategic Voting in the 1996 Japanese General Election</title><author>REED, STEVEN R.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c474t-77b5dd7ac4855f486953605f6b1d2327b84cbd7f01b147fdd38df34bcc284b563</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1999</creationdate><topic>Citizen participation</topic><topic>Comparative politics</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Elections</topic><topic>Electoral systems</topic><topic>Government and politics</topic><topic>Japan</topic><topic>Political participation</topic><topic>Political sociology</topic><topic>Proportional representation</topic><topic>Single-member constituencies</topic><topic>Strategy</topic><topic>Voter behavior</topic><topic>Voting</topic><topic>Voting behaviour</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>REED, STEVEN R.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>Comparative political studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>REED, STEVEN R.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Strategic Voting in the 1996 Japanese General Election</atitle><jtitle>Comparative political studies</jtitle><date>1999-04-01</date><risdate>1999</risdate><volume>32</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>257</spage><epage>270</epage><pages>257-270</pages><issn>0010-4140</issn><eissn>1552-3829</eissn><coden>CPLSBZ</coden><abstract>Japan's new electoral system may or may not be good for Japanese democracy, but it is almost ideally designed for the study of strategic voting. No other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) votes. Using candidate-level aggregate data, I find strong evidence for strategic voting: Candidates with a good chance of winning receive more SMD than PR votes, and those with little chance of winning receive more PR votes. Strategic voting explains not only the basic pattern but also several exceptions to the rule. In addition, I find that a realistic but relatively inaccurate ex ante prediction of a candidate's probability of victory produces a superior explanatory model than does a perfect ex post prediction calculated from the final electoral results. 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| ispartof | Comparative political studies, 1999-04, Vol.32 (2), p.257-270 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Access via SAGE; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library |
| subjects | Citizen participation Comparative politics Democracy Elections Electoral systems Government and politics Japan Political participation Political sociology Proportional representation Single-member constituencies Strategy Voter behavior Voting Voting behaviour |
| title | Strategic Voting in the 1996 Japanese General Election |
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