Stackelberg Rent-Seeking

In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides severa...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Public choice 1993-10, Vol.77 (2), p.307-321
1. Verfasser:	Linster, Bruce G.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT Economic Policy Economic rent Equilibrium Expenditures Game Theory GAME THEORY AND DECISION THEORY IN MODELS Games Indifference curves Lobbying MONOPOLIES, OLIGOPOLIES, AND ANTI-TRUST ACTIONS Monopoly Nash equilibrium REGULATION & REGULATORY POLICY Rent seeking behavior Rent-seeking RENTING Social costs Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results. I extend the problem to deal with cases of incomplete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent.
ISSN:	0048-5829 1573-7101
DOI:	10.1007/BF01047872