Risk and Economic Policy
Dans ce texte nous prétendons qu'une grande partie du débat sur le rôle des politiques gouvernementales, concernant l'atténuation de l'instabilité économique, n'a suffisament tenu compte du rôle des marchés de capitaux. Nous prétendons que dans une économie où les marchés prenant...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Canadian public policy 1990-09, Vol.16 (3), p.298-307 |
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description | Dans ce texte nous prétendons qu'une grande partie du débat sur le rôle des politiques gouvernementales, concernant l'atténuation de l'instabilité économique, n'a suffisament tenu compte du rôle des marchés de capitaux. Nous prétendons que dans une économie où les marchés prenant compte du risque fonctionnent bien, l'intervention publique direct pour contrecarrer les effets de l'instabilité économique, n'est généralement pas justifiée. L'intervention publique pour minimiser l'instabilité économique requiert l'existence d'imperfection dans l'économie de marché. Nous distinguons entre les risques diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes pour les individus et les risques non diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes qui ne se compensent pas l'un l'autre. Nous distinguons également entre les politiques sur les marchés prenant compte du risque, qui visent à faciliter la prise en compte par le secteur public de l'instabilité économique et les politiques de stabilisation qui visent à neutraliser la source d'instabilité économique du secteur privé. Selon le cas, l'une ou l'autre politique est la plus appropriée. /// In this paper, we argue that much of the debate regarding the role of government policy in mitigating economic instability has failed to give sufficient attention to the role of capital markets. We argue that in an economy with well-functioning markets for risk-bearing, direct public intervention to offset the effects of economic instability is not in general justified. The case for active public intervention in minimizing economic instability relies on 'imperfections' in the market economy. We distinguish between diversifiable risks, which create independent gains and losses for individuals, and non-diversifiable risks, which lead to gains or losses for individuals which are not offsetting. We also distinguish between risk-bearing market policies, which are directed at allowing the private sector to handle economic instability better, and stabilization policies, which are intended to offset the source of economic instability faced by the private sector. We argue that in some cases risk-bearing market policies are better, while in other cases stabilization policies are better. |
doi_str_mv | 10.2307/3551084 |
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Nous prétendons que dans une économie où les marchés prenant compte du risque fonctionnent bien, l'intervention publique direct pour contrecarrer les effets de l'instabilité économique, n'est généralement pas justifiée. L'intervention publique pour minimiser l'instabilité économique requiert l'existence d'imperfection dans l'économie de marché. Nous distinguons entre les risques diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes pour les individus et les risques non diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes qui ne se compensent pas l'un l'autre. Nous distinguons également entre les politiques sur les marchés prenant compte du risque, qui visent à faciliter la prise en compte par le secteur public de l'instabilité économique et les politiques de stabilisation qui visent à neutraliser la source d'instabilité économique du secteur privé. Selon le cas, l'une ou l'autre politique est la plus appropriée. /// In this paper, we argue that much of the debate regarding the role of government policy in mitigating economic instability has failed to give sufficient attention to the role of capital markets. We argue that in an economy with well-functioning markets for risk-bearing, direct public intervention to offset the effects of economic instability is not in general justified. The case for active public intervention in minimizing economic instability relies on 'imperfections' in the market economy. We distinguish between diversifiable risks, which create independent gains and losses for individuals, and non-diversifiable risks, which lead to gains or losses for individuals which are not offsetting. We also distinguish between risk-bearing market policies, which are directed at allowing the private sector to handle economic instability better, and stabilization policies, which are intended to offset the source of economic instability faced by the private sector. We argue that in some cases risk-bearing market policies are better, while in other cases stabilization policies are better.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0317-0861</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1911-9917</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/3551084</identifier><identifier>CODEN: CPPODB</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Downsview, Ont: University of Toronto Press</publisher><subject>Capital markets ; CAPITALISM ; ECONOMIC MEASURES ; Economic policy ; Economic stabilization ; ECONOMIC THEORY ; Financial risk ; Income taxes ; LAISSEZ-FAIRE-ISM ; Market economies ; OPEN MARKET THEORY ; Personal income taxes ; Private sector ; Public policy ; Risk ; Roles ; Stabilization policies ; Studies ; Taxpaying</subject><ispartof>Canadian public policy, 1990-09, Vol.16 (3), p.298-307</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1990 Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques</rights><rights>Copyright Canadian Public Policy Sep 1990</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3551084$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3551084$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,800,27847,27850,27905,27906,33755,57998,58231</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Mintz, Jack M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Purvis, Douglas D.</creatorcontrib><title>Risk and Economic Policy</title><title>Canadian public policy</title><description>Dans ce texte nous prétendons qu'une grande partie du débat sur le rôle des politiques gouvernementales, concernant l'atténuation de l'instabilité économique, n'a suffisament tenu compte du rôle des marchés de capitaux. Nous prétendons que dans une économie où les marchés prenant compte du risque fonctionnent bien, l'intervention publique direct pour contrecarrer les effets de l'instabilité économique, n'est généralement pas justifiée. L'intervention publique pour minimiser l'instabilité économique requiert l'existence d'imperfection dans l'économie de marché. Nous distinguons entre les risques diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes pour les individus et les risques non diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes qui ne se compensent pas l'un l'autre. Nous distinguons également entre les politiques sur les marchés prenant compte du risque, qui visent à faciliter la prise en compte par le secteur public de l'instabilité économique et les politiques de stabilisation qui visent à neutraliser la source d'instabilité économique du secteur privé. Selon le cas, l'une ou l'autre politique est la plus appropriée. /// In this paper, we argue that much of the debate regarding the role of government policy in mitigating economic instability has failed to give sufficient attention to the role of capital markets. We argue that in an economy with well-functioning markets for risk-bearing, direct public intervention to offset the effects of economic instability is not in general justified. The case for active public intervention in minimizing economic instability relies on 'imperfections' in the market economy. We distinguish between diversifiable risks, which create independent gains and losses for individuals, and non-diversifiable risks, which lead to gains or losses for individuals which are not offsetting. We also distinguish between risk-bearing market policies, which are directed at allowing the private sector to handle economic instability better, and stabilization policies, which are intended to offset the source of economic instability faced by the private sector. 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Nous prétendons que dans une économie où les marchés prenant compte du risque fonctionnent bien, l'intervention publique direct pour contrecarrer les effets de l'instabilité économique, n'est généralement pas justifiée. L'intervention publique pour minimiser l'instabilité économique requiert l'existence d'imperfection dans l'économie de marché. Nous distinguons entre les risques diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes pour les individus et les risques non diversifiables qui entraînent des gains et pertes qui ne se compensent pas l'un l'autre. Nous distinguons également entre les politiques sur les marchés prenant compte du risque, qui visent à faciliter la prise en compte par le secteur public de l'instabilité économique et les politiques de stabilisation qui visent à neutraliser la source d'instabilité économique du secteur privé. Selon le cas, l'une ou l'autre politique est la plus appropriée. /// In this paper, we argue that much of the debate regarding the role of government policy in mitigating economic instability has failed to give sufficient attention to the role of capital markets. We argue that in an economy with well-functioning markets for risk-bearing, direct public intervention to offset the effects of economic instability is not in general justified. The case for active public intervention in minimizing economic instability relies on 'imperfections' in the market economy. We distinguish between diversifiable risks, which create independent gains and losses for individuals, and non-diversifiable risks, which lead to gains or losses for individuals which are not offsetting. We also distinguish between risk-bearing market policies, which are directed at allowing the private sector to handle economic instability better, and stabilization policies, which are intended to offset the source of economic instability faced by the private sector. We argue that in some cases risk-bearing market policies are better, while in other cases stabilization policies are better.</abstract><cop>Downsview, Ont</cop><pub>University of Toronto Press</pub><doi>10.2307/3551084</doi><tpages>10</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Capital markets CAPITALISM ECONOMIC MEASURES Economic policy Economic stabilization ECONOMIC THEORY Financial risk Income taxes LAISSEZ-FAIRE-ISM Market economies OPEN MARKET THEORY Personal income taxes Private sector Public policy Risk Roles Stabilization policies Studies Taxpaying |
title | Risk and Economic Policy |
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