Presidential Power as a Domestic Constraint on Foreign Policy: Case Studies Examining Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND COMMENTATORS HAVE FREQUENTLY CLAIMED THAT THE PRO-ISRAELI LOBBY, SPECIFICALLY THE AMERICAN ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, DICTATES U.S. POLICY REGARDING ARMS SALES TO ARAB NATIONS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE PRO-ISRAELI LOBBIES CONTRIBUTE LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO POLITICAL...

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Veröffentlicht in:Presidential studies quarterly 1996-10, Vol.26 (4), p.1099-1113
1. Verfasser: Price, Daniel E.
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description AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND COMMENTATORS HAVE FREQUENTLY CLAIMED THAT THE PRO-ISRAELI LOBBY, SPECIFICALLY THE AMERICAN ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, DICTATES U.S. POLICY REGARDING ARMS SALES TO ARAB NATIONS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE PRO-ISRAELI LOBBIES CONTRIBUTE LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, THIS WILL INSURE SUPPORT FOR THEIR POLICIES. HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED HAS BEEN ANECDOTAL AND DOES NOT CONSIDER COMPETING THEORIES. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES FOUR HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL ARMS PROPOSALS TO SAUDI ARABIA IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THIS INTEREST GROUP EXPLANATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ALONG WITH THEORIES THAT FOCUS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Arab-Israeli conflict
Arms sales
ARMS SALES OR TRANSFERS
Arms Trade
Case studies
Executive branch
Executive power
Foreign Policy
INTEREST GROUP
International relations
Lobbying
Missiles
National interests
Policy analysis
Political campaigns
Political interest groups
Politics and Interest Group Influence on U.S. Diplomacy
Power
POWER, PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING
Presidency
PRESIDENCY (ALL NATIONS)
SAUDI ARABIA
Senators
U.S.A
United States
United States Senate
Voting
Weapons
title Presidential Power as a Domestic Constraint on Foreign Policy: Case Studies Examining Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia
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