Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt

This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring i...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of political economy 1991-08, Vol.99 (4), p.689-721
1. Verfasser: Diamond, Douglas W.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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