Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this sh...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of political economy 1992-10, Vol.100 (5), p.929-953 |
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| container_title | The Journal of political economy |
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| creator | Green, Richard J. Newbery, David M. |
| description | Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, we show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices, at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/261846 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The Journal of political economy, 1992-10, Vol.100 (5), p.929-953 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Competition Cost functions Demand curves Duopolies Economic models Economic theory Economics Electric generators Electric power Electric utilities Electricity Electricity distribution Great Britain Marginal cost pricing Marginal costs Market (electricity) Market prices Political economy Privatization Supply Supply schedule |
| title | Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market |
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