Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales
Allegations of Bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest were common in the 1970s. Of course, prices may be low for reasons other than collusion. We formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of political economy 1997-08, Vol.105 (4), p.657-699 |
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| container_title | The Journal of political economy |
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| creator | Baldwin, Laura H. Marshall, Robert C. Richard, Jean‐Francois |
| description | Allegations of Bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest were common in the 1970s. Of course, prices may be low for reasons other than collusion. We formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions. Noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold (the standard auction model) is a special case: it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion. We also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/262089 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The Journal of political economy, 1997-08, Vol.105 (4), p.657-699 |
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| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60759011 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run); Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Auctions Bidders Bidding Collusion Datasets Economic models Economic theory Empirical modeling Forest Service National forests Natural Resources Political Economy Studies Supply Supply & demand Timber Timber industry United States |
| title | Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales |
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