Bicameralism and the Core: An Experimental Test
While the primary problem confronting democratic theorists in the past several decades has been majority rule instability, recent formal results suggest that this problem is diminished by long-standing constitutional provisions such as bicameralism. Bicameralism should theoretically be much more lik...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Legislative studies quarterly 1996-02, Vol.21 (1), p.83-103 |
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| container_title | Legislative studies quarterly |
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| creator | Miller, Gary J. Hammond, Thomas H. Kile, Charles |
| description | While the primary problem confronting democratic theorists in the past several decades has been majority rule instability, recent formal results suggest that this problem is diminished by long-standing constitutional provisions such as bicameralism. Bicameralism should theoretically be much more likely to create a set of stable and undominated outcomes—a core. This paper reports a series of experiments testing whether individuals partitioned into two chambers do in fact behave as the formal theory of bicameralism predicts. In two sets of trials, the outcome chosen under a given bicameral partition is almost always in the bicameral core for that partition, and a change in the bicameral partition has a statistically significant impact on the choice of outcome. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/440160 |
| format | Article |
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Bicameralism should theoretically be much more likely to create a set of stable and undominated outcomes—a core. This paper reports a series of experiments testing whether individuals partitioned into two chambers do in fact behave as the formal theory of bicameralism predicts. In two sets of trials, the outcome chosen under a given bicameral partition is almost always in the bicameral core for that partition, and a change in the bicameral partition has a statistically significant impact on the choice of outcome.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0362-9805</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/440160</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa</publisher><subject>BEHAVIOR OF MAJOR PARTS OF A GROUP ; Bicameral legislatures ; Bicameralism ; CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT ; DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND INSTITUTIONS ; Experiment design ; Fairness ; Game theory ; Legislation ; Legislators ; Legislatures ; Majority rule ; Null hypothesis ; PARTITIONS AND PARTITIONING, DIVISION OF AN EXISTING POLITICAL-GEOGRAPHICAL ENTITY INTO TWO OR MORE AUTONOMOUS ZONES ; THEORY BUILDING OR THEORETICAL APPROACH ; United States ; Upper houses ; Voting</subject><ispartof>Legislative studies quarterly, 1996-02, Vol.21 (1), p.83-103</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c272t-456e9ee32b81fd98c701677ba0c11753f4273b04586af42b316e5babcc8a04253</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/440160$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/440160$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,27903,27904,57996,58229</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Miller, Gary J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hammond, Thomas H.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kile, Charles</creatorcontrib><title>Bicameralism and the Core: An Experimental Test</title><title>Legislative studies quarterly</title><description>While the primary problem confronting democratic theorists in the past several decades has been majority rule instability, recent formal results suggest that this problem is diminished by long-standing constitutional provisions such as bicameralism. 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Bicameralism should theoretically be much more likely to create a set of stable and undominated outcomes—a core. This paper reports a series of experiments testing whether individuals partitioned into two chambers do in fact behave as the formal theory of bicameralism predicts. In two sets of trials, the outcome chosen under a given bicameral partition is almost always in the bicameral core for that partition, and a change in the bicameral partition has a statistically significant impact on the choice of outcome.</abstract><pub>Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa</pub><doi>10.2307/440160</doi><tpages>21</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0362-9805 |
| ispartof | Legislative studies quarterly, 1996-02, Vol.21 (1), p.83-103 |
| issn | 0362-9805 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60758144 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Jstor Complete Legacy |
| subjects | BEHAVIOR OF MAJOR PARTS OF A GROUP Bicameral legislatures Bicameralism CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND INSTITUTIONS Experiment design Fairness Game theory Legislation Legislators Legislatures Majority rule Null hypothesis PARTITIONS AND PARTITIONING, DIVISION OF AN EXISTING POLITICAL-GEOGRAPHICAL ENTITY INTO TWO OR MORE AUTONOMOUS ZONES THEORY BUILDING OR THEORETICAL APPROACH United States Upper houses Voting |
| title | Bicameralism and the Core: An Experimental Test |
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