Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models
In markets with avoidable fixed costs, the core may be empty. I argue that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists. I set up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compare those implications with those of a cartel model. I compare the two model...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of political economy 1989-10, Vol.97 (5), p.1160-1179 |
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| container_title | The Journal of political economy |
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| creator | Sjostrom, William |
| description | In markets with avoidable fixed costs, the core may be empty. I argue that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists. I set up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compare those implications with those of a cartel model. I compare the two models empirically with data from liner shipping conferences, legal collusive agreements that have been in force for over a century, and I conclude that the evidence supports the theory of the core. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/261647 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-3808 |
| ispartof | The Journal of political economy, 1989-10, Vol.97 (5), p.1160-1179 |
| issn | 0022-3808 1537-534X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60738248 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Periodicals Index Online; Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete (EBSCO) |
| subjects | Average cost Cartels Collusion Demand curves Economic models Economic Theory Elasticity of demand Fixed costs Maritime industry Market prices Monopolies Ocean shipping Ocean traffic Political economy Price fixing Sea transport Shipping Shipping industry Studies Sunk costs Supply curves Transportation |
| title | Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Models |
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