Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior

Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior

A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate's intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest...

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Veröffentlicht in:European Journal of Political Economy 1997, Vol.13 (1), p.1-31
Hauptverfasser: Potters, Jan, Sloof, Randolph, van Winden, Frans
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Campaign expenditures
Campaigns
Endorsements
Expenditure
Interest Groups
Voting Behavior
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container_title European Journal of Political Economy
container_volume 13
creator Potters, Jan
Sloof, Randolph
van Winden, Frans
description A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate's intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate's campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00032-8
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source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Campaign expenditures
Campaigns
Endorsements
Expenditure
Interest Groups
Voting Behavior
title Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior
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