Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?

Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?

Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive‐compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. We employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Our results lead us to reject that hypoth...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of political economy 1997-06, Vol.105 (3), p.609-621
Hauptverfasser: Cummings, Ronald G., Elliott, Steven, Harrison, Glenn W., Murphy, James
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic theory
Economics
Environmental Politics
Experimentation
Financial transactions
Honesty
Hypotheses
Incentives
Majority rule
Null hypothesis
Political Economy
Public policy
Referendum
Referendums
Regression analysis
Research methodology
Response rates
Socioeconomic factors
Studies
Theory
Voter behavior
Voting
Voting Behavior
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive‐compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. We employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Our results lead us to reject that hypothesis.
ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/262084