Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism
This paper applies modern tools of economic analysis to examine the nature of transnational terrorism and associated collective action concerns that arise in the aftermath of September 11. Throughout the paper, the strategic interaction between rational terrorists and targeted governments are unders...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | World economy 2003-06, Vol.26 (6), p.779-802 |
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| creator | Sandler, Todd |
| description | This paper applies modern tools of economic analysis to examine the nature of transnational terrorism and associated collective action concerns that arise in the aftermath of September 11. Throughout the paper, the strategic interaction between rational terrorists and targeted governments are underscored. Networked terrorists draw on their collective strengths to exploit a maximum advantage over targeted governments’ inadequate and uncoordinated responses. A wide range of issues are explored including governments’ deterrence races, undersupplied pre‐emption, and suicidal attacks. Myriad substitutions by terrorists limit government anti‐terrorism policy effectiveness. A host of policy responses are evaluated in light of economic analysis and past econometric evidence. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1467-9701.00548 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0378-5920 |
| ispartof | World economy, 2003-06, Vol.26 (6), p.779-802 |
| issn | 0378-5920 1467-9701 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60699869 |
| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Collective action Conflict Cooperation Defence policy Economic theory Economics Game theory International Cooperation International economics International Relations International security National security Retaliation Security Policy September 11 Suicide bombings Terrorism Transnational terrorism Transnationalism |
| title | Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism |
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