Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest

Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private‐sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It...

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Veröffentlicht in:Governance (Oxford) 2005-07, Vol.18 (3), p.399-429
Hauptverfasser: MATTLI, WALTER, BÜTHE, TIM
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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