Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU ? a Myopic Economic Approach
Over 10 years ago the EU Commission proposed a directive on carbon taxes, but faced so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until last year - and after it had been considerably watered down. The aim of this paper is to look into economic reasons for the political infeasibility of...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International environmental agreements : politics, law and economics law and economics, 2004-01, Vol.4 (3), p.279-302 |
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| creator | Froyn, Camilla Bretteville Aaheim, H. Asbj rn |
| description | Over 10 years ago the EU Commission proposed a directive on carbon taxes, but faced so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until last year - and after it had been considerably watered down. The aim of this paper is to look into economic reasons for the political infeasibility of extensive carbon taxes. Since opposition is believed to arise prior to the policy implementation, the cost estimates have a myopic character compared with market estimates, in the sense that sectors are presumed to take into account their own substitution opportunities, but disregard changes in other sectors as well as the macroeconomic welfare gains from a tax regime. With this myopic approach, we estimate and compare costs of emissions cuts across sectors and across countries in the EU, showing how different sectors might have anticipated the impacts from an expected carbon tax. This focus illustrates that what seems to be cost-effective and to the best for the region on paper turned out too controversial to be politically feasible. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10784-004-1156-5 |
| format | Article |
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This focus illustrates that what seems to be cost-effective and to the best for the region on paper turned out too controversial to be politically feasible. 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Asbj rn</creatorcontrib><title>Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU ? a Myopic Economic Approach</title><title>International environmental agreements : politics, law and economics</title><description>Over 10 years ago the EU Commission proposed a directive on carbon taxes, but faced so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until last year - and after it had been considerably watered down. The aim of this paper is to look into economic reasons for the political infeasibility of extensive carbon taxes. Since opposition is believed to arise prior to the policy implementation, the cost estimates have a myopic character compared with market estimates, in the sense that sectors are presumed to take into account their own substitution opportunities, but disregard changes in other sectors as well as the macroeconomic welfare gains from a tax regime. With this myopic approach, we estimate and compare costs of emissions cuts across sectors and across countries in the EU, showing how different sectors might have anticipated the impacts from an expected carbon tax. This focus illustrates that what seems to be cost-effective and to the best for the region on paper turned out too controversial to be politically feasible. 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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Agreements Carbon Climate policy Conflicts of interest Cost estimates Crossnational Differences Economics Emissions control Energy Environmental policy Environmental Protection Environmental tax EU directives European Union Interest groups Lobbying Macroeconomics Mathematical models Production costs Public Opinion Statistical analysis Tax rates Taxation Taxes |
| title | Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU ? a Myopic Economic Approach |
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