Power and Political Institutions
Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others, depending on who has the...
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description | Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as
structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action
problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives
rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others,
depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political
institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be
structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this.
As a result, it gives us a one-sided and overly benign view of what
political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood,
and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. For there is a
widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is
frequently discussed, it is an integral part of the theory and
just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined
efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic
roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to
argue that a more balanced theory—one that brings power from its
periphery to its very core—is both necessary and entirely
possible.Terry M. Moe is the William
Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (moe@hoover.stanford.edu). An
earlier version of this article was presented at the Yale Conference on
Crafting and Operating Institutions, April 11–13, 2003. The author
would like to thank Sven Feldmann, Lloyd Gruber, James Fearon, Peter Hall,
Jennifer Hochschild, Stephen Krasner, Chris Mantzavinos, Gary Miller, Paul
Pierson, Theda Skocpol, Barry Weingast, and anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S1537592705050176 |
format | Article |
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structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action
problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives
rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others,
depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political
institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be
structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this.
As a result, it gives us a one-sided and overly benign view of what
political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood,
and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. For there is a
widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is
frequently discussed, it is an integral part of the theory and
just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined
efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic
roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to
argue that a more balanced theory—one that brings power from its
periphery to its very core—is both necessary and entirely
possible.Terry M. Moe is the William
Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (moe@hoover.stanford.edu). An
earlier version of this article was presented at the Yale Conference on
Crafting and Operating Institutions, April 11–13, 2003. The author
would like to thank Sven Feldmann, Lloyd Gruber, James Fearon, Peter Hall,
Jennifer Hochschild, Stephen Krasner, Chris Mantzavinos, Gary Miller, Paul
Pierson, Theda Skocpol, Barry Weingast, and anonymous reviewers for their
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structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action
problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives
rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others,
depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political
institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be
structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this.
As a result, it gives us a one-sided and overly benign view of what
political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood,
and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. For there is a
widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is
frequently discussed, it is an integral part of the theory and
just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined
efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic
roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to
argue that a more balanced theory—one that brings power from its
periphery to its very core—is both necessary and entirely
possible.Terry M. Moe is the William
Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (moe@hoover.stanford.edu). An
earlier version of this article was presented at the Yale Conference on
Crafting and Operating Institutions, April 11–13, 2003. The author
would like to thank Sven Feldmann, Lloyd Gruber, James Fearon, Peter Hall,
Jennifer Hochschild, Stephen Krasner, Chris Mantzavinos, Gary Miller, Paul
Pierson, Theda Skocpol, Barry Weingast, and anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments.</description><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Government bureaucracy</subject><subject>Institutions</subject><subject>International economic cooperation</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Political institutions</subject><subject>Political Philosophy</subject><subject>Political Power</subject><subject>Political Science Theories</subject><subject>Rational choice theory</subject><subject>Social Theories</subject><issn>1537-5927</issn><issn>1541-0986</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNp9UMtKAzEUDaJgrX6A4KIrd6M3j0kySyk-CgUFdR0ymURSppOaZBD_3pQpbgS5i3u45wH3IHSJ4QYDFrevuKaiboiAugwW_AjNcM1wBY3kx3tMRbXnT9FZShsAQijIGVq8hC8bF3roCup99kb3i9WQss9j9mFI5-jE6T7Zi8Oeo_eH-7flU7V-flwt79aVocBy5YjpuHGd5Jw6wxxjutaNJZxxSawRIDqQmhnblZvmdcta2wgB4FyLcWvpHF1PubsYPkebstr6ZGzf68GGMSkOnDcNhSLEk9DEkFK0Tu2i3-r4rTCofRfqTxfFczV5NimH-GugXEogotD0EKm3bfTdh1WbMMah_PtP6A8khWl7</recordid><startdate>20050601</startdate><enddate>20050601</enddate><creator>Moe, Terry M.</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20050601</creationdate><title>Power and Political Institutions</title><author>Moe, Terry M.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c304t-f2cd6cfd8663fc4f44a5a9e264682ec707d08a4cede26a65b4be97700ffb11be3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Government bureaucracy</topic><topic>Institutions</topic><topic>International economic cooperation</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Political institutions</topic><topic>Political Philosophy</topic><topic>Political Power</topic><topic>Political Science Theories</topic><topic>Rational choice theory</topic><topic>Social Theories</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Moe, Terry M.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>Perspectives on politics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Moe, Terry M.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Power and Political Institutions</atitle><jtitle>Perspectives on politics</jtitle><addtitle>Persp on Pol</addtitle><date>2005-06-01</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>3</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>215</spage><epage>233</epage><pages>215-233</pages><issn>1537-5927</issn><eissn>1541-0986</eissn><abstract>Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as
structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action
problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives
rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others,
depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political
institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be
structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this.
As a result, it gives us a one-sided and overly benign view of what
political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood,
and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. For there is a
widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is
frequently discussed, it is an integral part of the theory and
just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined
efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic
roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to
argue that a more balanced theory—one that brings power from its
periphery to its very core—is both necessary and entirely
possible.Terry M. Moe is the William
Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (moe@hoover.stanford.edu). An
earlier version of this article was presented at the Yale Conference on
Crafting and Operating Institutions, April 11–13, 2003. The author
would like to thank Sven Feldmann, Lloyd Gruber, James Fearon, Peter Hall,
Jennifer Hochschild, Stephen Krasner, Chris Mantzavinos, Gary Miller, Paul
Pierson, Theda Skocpol, Barry Weingast, and anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments.</abstract><cop>New York, USA</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/S1537592705050176</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
subjects | Cooperation Democracy Economic theory Government bureaucracy Institutions International economic cooperation Legislators Political institutions Political Philosophy Political Power Political Science Theories Rational choice theory Social Theories |
title | Power and Political Institutions |
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