A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats
A realistic theory of economic sanctions should be built on the facts that sanctions are a game of issue linkage involving two or more issues, players may not know each other's preferences for the outcome of the game, and threatening sanctions may be as important as imposing sanctions as a stra...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of politics 2004-02, Vol.66 (1), p.25-42 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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