Strategy-proofness and markets

If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences is restricted and standard social choice theorems do not apply. A substantial body of analysis, however, strongly supports the notion that attractive strategy-proof social choice functions do not exis...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2001-01, Vol.18 (1), p.37-58
1. Verfasser:	Satterthwaite, Mark A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Auction markets Auctions Bayesian method Economic models Economic theory Fixed prices Game Theory Market Market equilibrium Market mechanisms Market prices Market size Markets Mathematical functions Microeconomics Preferences Price theory Pricing strategies Public choice Rational Choice Social choice Social services Studies Trade
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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