Proportional Election Evaluation in Two-Vote Electoral Systems without Surplus Mandates

Proportional Election Evaluation in Two-Vote Electoral Systems without Surplus Mandates

The evaluation algorithms for regional & federal parliamentary electoral systems are often subject to amazing inconsistencies. High counts & quotas result in party mandates that are won or lost according to voting relationships, without a comprehensible proportional distribution. The two-vot...

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Veröffentlicht in:Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2003-03, Vol.34 (1), p.146-165
1. Verfasser: Sauer, Gustav W
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Sprache:ger
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Electoral Systems
Parliamentary Systems
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creator Sauer, Gustav W
description The evaluation algorithms for regional & federal parliamentary electoral systems are often subject to amazing inconsistencies. High counts & quotas result in party mandates that are won or lost according to voting relationships, without a comprehensible proportional distribution. The two-vote model presented here cuts off decimal remainders & provides for a direct mandate that divides the two-vote strictly proportionally. In addition, surplus mandates are maintained through a linear-complementary coupling of direct & two-vote mandates. An international & federal comparison of parliament size further demonstrates that federal & regional majorities are over-balanced. In that the presented model allows the two-vote mandate to be relationally reduced according to voter participation, savings could be demanded from the parliament as well. 9 Tables. L. Kehl
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Electoral Systems
Parliamentary Systems
title Proportional Election Evaluation in Two-Vote Electoral Systems without Surplus Mandates
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