A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game-t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of political science 2003-04, Vol.47 (2), p.274-292
1. Verfasser:	Ting, Michael M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency Bureaucracy Collective Action Collective action problem Competition Design Dominant strategy Game Theory Government Government bureaucracy Intuition Jurisdiction Marginal costs Nash equilibrium Policy Making Political science Redundancy Redundant components Technology policy
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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