The Dictatorship of Merchants
Shopkeepers & merchants are used as a metaphor to describe the detrimental influence of provincial politicians in Russian regional politics. It is argued that most Russian governors & mayors do not come to office with a specific program benefiting the local constituency, but to advance their...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Svobodnaâ mislʹ (Moskva) 2001-01, Vol.53 (6), p.53-58 |
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creator | Barzilov, Sergey Ivanovich Chernyshov, Aleksey Gennadievich |
description | Shopkeepers & merchants are used as a metaphor to describe the detrimental influence of provincial politicians in Russian regional politics. It is argued that most Russian governors & mayors do not come to office with a specific program benefiting the local constituency, but to advance their own political careers & economic interest. They view their posts as temporary & transitory on their way to a better position in their party or the central government in Moscow. Their presence on local governing bodies prevents the formulation & execution of enlightened, long-term, & broad-scope programs benefiting the area as a whole & in all its complexities. These merchant-politicians are not interested in intellectual discourse or economic models, since they only look after their own self-interest, divert the region's capital & resources to objectives far from best public benefit, & lead to the formation of economic & political oligarchies, cliques, & clans. The norms, principles, & role models espoused by this provincial establishment are fluid at best & nonexistent most of the time. Z. Dubiel |
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source | Online Serials From Russia/NIS Available from East View (UDB-IND); Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
subjects | Corruption Local Government Local Politics Patronage Politicians Postcommunist Societies Regionalism Russia |
title | The Dictatorship of Merchants |
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