Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers
. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited,...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal of political research 2000-05, Vol.37 (3), p.377-395 |
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| container_title | European journal of political research |
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| creator | ANDEWEG, RUDY B. |
| description | . Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1475-6765.00518 |
| format | Article |
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The delegation process between cabinet and ministers</title><title>European journal of political research</title><description>. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.</description><subject>Executive power</subject><subject>Executive-legislative relations</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Interorganizational Relations</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Ministers</subject><subject>Parliament</subject><subject>Parliamentary government</subject><subject>Political Systems</subject><subject>Public Officials</subject><issn>0304-4130</issn><issn>1475-6765</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2000</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkM9PwjAUgBujiYievfbkbfC6tut2MgYBf6ASg5F4abrtDadjw3UE-e_dnHKllybN9730fYScM-ix-vSZUNLxlCd7AJL5B6SzezkkHeAgHME4HJMTaz8AgPkB65DpQ5qntsLSUmNpXKzDDKlZYF7ZSzp7RxpjhgtTpUVOV2URobU0xGqDmNPIhGmOFTV5TJf_Y07JUWIyi2d_d5e8jIazwY0zeRrfDq4mTiQkKCfkvowhAOUK4XqCeSJJJDcsMsp1WYJSqhi4kgZMoGTA4lAmwMLIuJECGQreJRft3PpXX2u0lV6mNsIsMzkWa6s9kIHkbrAX5H7gcgayBvstGJWFtSUmelWmS1NuNQPdJNZNUN0E1b-Ja0O0xibNcLsP18O76TNXqtacVmuKfe80U37WdL2zfn0cazEevd1P5td6zn8AHA6L6A</recordid><startdate>200005</startdate><enddate>200005</enddate><creator>ANDEWEG, RUDY B.</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200005</creationdate><title>Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers</title><author>ANDEWEG, RUDY B.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4507-b385d0907244264164ff53a1ca7221fe557d0375a0a97591db5f01bca2c705b43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2000</creationdate><topic>Executive power</topic><topic>Executive-legislative relations</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Interorganizational Relations</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Ministers</topic><topic>Parliament</topic><topic>Parliamentary government</topic><topic>Political Systems</topic><topic>Public Officials</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>ANDEWEG, RUDY B.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>European journal of political research</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>ANDEWEG, RUDY B.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Ministers as double agents? 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0304-4130 |
| ispartof | European journal of political research, 2000-05, Vol.37 (3), p.377-395 |
| issn | 0304-4130 1475-6765 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Executive power Executive-legislative relations Government Interorganizational Relations Legislators Ministers Parliament Parliamentary government Political Systems Public Officials |
| title | Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers |
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