Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations
The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International studies quarterly 2004-06, Vol.48 (2), p.455-470 |
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| container_end_page | 470 |
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| container_title | International studies quarterly |
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| creator | Majeski, Stephen J. |
| description | The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating asymmetric power among agents in a set of (2 x 2) games that represent different forms of conflict and cooperation prevalent in international relations (Chicken, Stag, Assurance, Deadlock, and Prisoner's Dilemma) is developed and analyzed via simulation. Simulation results indicate that the introduction of asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both cooperative agents survive and cooperative worlds evolve. This is particularly the case when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. Also, anticipated variations in outcomes across the game structures regarding the likelihood of cooperation are supported. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00309.x |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | International studies quarterly, 2004-06, Vol.48 (2), p.455-470 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Balance of Power Cooperation Game Theory Games International Conflict International Cooperation International politics International Relations International relations theory Modeling Nation states Political power Prisoners dilemma Simulations Social evolution Social interaction |
| title | Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations |
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