When Do War Chests Deter?

I present a repeated election model of campaign fund-raising and spending where the incumbent may use money not spent in one election for a future election, i.e. may create a war chest. I characterize the conditions where an incumbent creates a war chest for deterrence. The strongest incumbents do n...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of theoretical politics 2005-04, Vol.17 (2), p.249-277
1. Verfasser:	Goodliffe, Jay
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Candidates Competition Deterrence Elections Electoral campaigning Fund Raising Incumbency Political behavior Political Campaigns Political finance Political theory
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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