Two Forms of Theorizing about Law
An argument for the view that H. Hart's Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) is a social science theory of law in the sense that his views about the nature of law have been expressed in external statements of fact which have served to map out the boundaries of legal thought & prep...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Mind 1977-10, Vol.86 (344), p.595-599 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | An argument for the view that H. Hart's Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) is a social science theory of law in the sense that his views about the nature of law have been expressed in external statements of fact which have served to map out the boundaries of legal thought & prepare grounds for its empirical investigation. But his theory has often been confused with legal formalism or the view that law is a system of rules. A programmatic statement is made of how Hart's theory of law may be integrated with the social sciences of law, especially legal anthropology. Analytical jurisprudence is the theoretic end of the social sciences of law. Failure to distinguish this form of legal theorizing from juristic or institutional theories of law has led to neglect of Hart's work by social scientists. The prevailing division between 'descriptive' legal theory & legal research has resulted in discontinuities of empirical research. Further, the proliferation of juristic theories of law as guides for empirical research in legal science has resulted in much confused thinking about law & legal studies. Modified AA. |
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ISSN: | 0026-4423 1460-2113 |