Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density
Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems respond to environmental factors. As legislatur...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Legislative studies quarterly 2001-11, Vol.26 (4), p.661-679 |
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| container_title | Legislative studies quarterly |
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| creator | Berkman, Michael B. |
| description | Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? The Energy-Stability-Area model developed by Gray and Lowery (1996) implicitly suggests they do. I argue that legislative professionalism conditions how group systems respond to environmental factors. As legislatures professionalize, their demand for information from lobbyists decreases. Groups are in this and other ways less effective in professional legislatures and more likely to exit a crowded group system. I model interest density with professionalism as a contextual variable. The results have implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-institutionalization. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/440274 |
| format | Article |
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The results have implications for the number and mix of interests, the impact of lobbying regulations, and the consequences of legislative de-institutionalization.</description><subject>Constituents</subject><subject>Flux density</subject><subject>Interest Groups</subject><subject>Legislative Bodies</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Legislatures</subject><subject>Lobbying</subject><subject>Local government</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Political interest groups</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Professionalism</subject><subject>Professionalization</subject><subject>States (Political Subdivisions)</subject><issn>0362-9805</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2001</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNpFkDFPwzAQhT2ARCnwB1g8sRUcJ45tNlSgVKpEhzJHTnIGV0kcfA6i_56UVjDd6d6np3uPkKuE3fKUybssY1xmJ2TC0pzPtGLijJwjbhlLpFZ8QvwK3h02JrovoOvgLSA635nGYUtNV9P4AfQR2v1qfaCL4Ice7-lmPC87jC4O8Zenc99F-I7U21GIEAAjXft-2Hv7bvTo0MXdBTm1pkG4PM4peXt-2sxfZqvXxXL-sJpVXPI4A8WMTXRZ17kSKuFaV1zpRAipdF2x1EjJZCYrBVCWwgpe25JrIzKVj4khS6fk5uDbB_85jL8UrcMKmsZ04AcsciZyxoT8B6vgEQPYog-uNWFXJKzYd1gcOhzB6wO4xejDH3VUfwBYSW-X</recordid><startdate>20011101</startdate><enddate>20011101</enddate><creator>Berkman, Michael B.</creator><general>Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20011101</creationdate><title>Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density</title><author>Berkman, Michael B.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c272t-e80af19bdd68581299c289155789dc03a770747c8eebb5f52dfb29a5486402e43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2001</creationdate><topic>Constituents</topic><topic>Flux density</topic><topic>Interest Groups</topic><topic>Legislative Bodies</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Lobbying</topic><topic>Local government</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Political interest groups</topic><topic>Political parties</topic><topic>Professionalism</topic><topic>Professionalization</topic><topic>States (Political Subdivisions)</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Berkman, Michael B.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>Legislative studies quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Berkman, Michael B.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density</atitle><jtitle>Legislative studies quarterly</jtitle><date>2001-11-01</date><risdate>2001</risdate><volume>26</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>661</spage><epage>679</epage><pages>661-679</pages><issn>0362-9805</issn><abstract>Do state interest group systems develop independently of the legislatures they lobby? 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0362-9805 |
| ispartof | Legislative studies quarterly, 2001-11, Vol.26 (4), p.661-679 |
| issn | 0362-9805 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60560057 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Constituents Flux density Interest Groups Legislative Bodies Legislators Legislatures Lobbying Local government Modeling Political interest groups Political parties Professionalism Professionalization States (Political Subdivisions) |
| title | Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density |
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