Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional vet...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:European Union politics 2009-12, Vol.10 (4), p.507-534
Hauptverfasser: König, Thomas, Junge, Dirk
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 534
container_issue 4
container_start_page 507
container_title European Union politics
container_volume 10
creator König, Thomas
Junge, Dirk
description Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.
doi_str_mv 10.1177/1465116509346780
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60517481</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sage_id>10.1177_1465116509346780</sage_id><sourcerecordid>37218214</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c343t-c3472af228b73883d5141cad9543a38f2ee1f7e6b971a0e9ec9d4db558e7e4a53</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkM1Kw0AUhQdRsFb3LmcluIjOnZ_MZCVSf6FgF60uh2lyY1vSTp1JkOx8DV_PJzGhrgRxc--F850L5xByCuwCQOtLkKkCSBXLhEy1YXtkAFpCwrXS-93dyUmvH5KjGFeMcZZJNSDnL4uW3vjN18dnTZ-x9nRSuRZDpLOIdLrAZaAT_47h6pgclK6KePKzh2R2dzsdPSTjp_vH0fU4yYUUdT81dyXnZq6FMaJQICF3RaakcMKUHBFKjek80-AYZphnhSzmShnUKJ0SQ3K2-7sN_q3BWNv1MuZYVW6Dvok2ZaoLZuBfUGgOhoPsQLYD8-BjDFjabViuXWgtMNuXZ3-X11mSnSW6V7Qr34RNl_lv_htDuGz2</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>37218214</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>SAGE Complete</source><creator>König, Thomas ; Junge, Dirk</creator><creatorcontrib>König, Thomas ; Junge, Dirk</creatorcontrib><description>Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1465-1165</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1741-2757</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/1465116509346780</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London, England: SAGE Publications</publisher><subject>Commissions ; Consensus ; Council of Ministers ; Decision making ; Europe ; European Commission ; European Union ; Governance ; Legislative Process ; Member states ; Policy Reform ; Political Power ; States (Political Subdivisions) ; Veto ; Voting Behavior ; Voting behaviour</subject><ispartof>European Union politics, 2009-12, Vol.10 (4), p.507-534</ispartof><rights>The Author(s), 2009.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c343t-c3472af228b73883d5141cad9543a38f2ee1f7e6b971a0e9ec9d4db558e7e4a53</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c343t-c3472af228b73883d5141cad9543a38f2ee1f7e6b971a0e9ec9d4db558e7e4a53</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1465116509346780$$EPDF$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116509346780$$EHTML$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,21819,27924,27925,43621,43622</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>König, Thomas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Junge, Dirk</creatorcontrib><title>Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?</title><title>European Union politics</title><description>Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.</description><subject>Commissions</subject><subject>Consensus</subject><subject>Council of Ministers</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Europe</subject><subject>European Commission</subject><subject>European Union</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>Legislative Process</subject><subject>Member states</subject><subject>Policy Reform</subject><subject>Political Power</subject><subject>States (Political Subdivisions)</subject><subject>Veto</subject><subject>Voting Behavior</subject><subject>Voting behaviour</subject><issn>1465-1165</issn><issn>1741-2757</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkM1Kw0AUhQdRsFb3LmcluIjOnZ_MZCVSf6FgF60uh2lyY1vSTp1JkOx8DV_PJzGhrgRxc--F850L5xByCuwCQOtLkKkCSBXLhEy1YXtkAFpCwrXS-93dyUmvH5KjGFeMcZZJNSDnL4uW3vjN18dnTZ-x9nRSuRZDpLOIdLrAZaAT_47h6pgclK6KePKzh2R2dzsdPSTjp_vH0fU4yYUUdT81dyXnZq6FMaJQICF3RaakcMKUHBFKjek80-AYZphnhSzmShnUKJ0SQ3K2-7sN_q3BWNv1MuZYVW6Dvok2ZaoLZuBfUGgOhoPsQLYD8-BjDFjabViuXWgtMNuXZ3-X11mSnSW6V7Qr34RNl_lv_htDuGz2</recordid><startdate>200912</startdate><enddate>200912</enddate><creator>König, Thomas</creator><creator>Junge, Dirk</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200912</creationdate><title>Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?</title><author>König, Thomas ; Junge, Dirk</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c343t-c3472af228b73883d5141cad9543a38f2ee1f7e6b971a0e9ec9d4db558e7e4a53</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2009</creationdate><topic>Commissions</topic><topic>Consensus</topic><topic>Council of Ministers</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Europe</topic><topic>European Commission</topic><topic>European Union</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Legislative Process</topic><topic>Member states</topic><topic>Policy Reform</topic><topic>Political Power</topic><topic>States (Political Subdivisions)</topic><topic>Veto</topic><topic>Voting Behavior</topic><topic>Voting behaviour</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>König, Thomas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Junge, Dirk</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>European Union politics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>König, Thomas</au><au>Junge, Dirk</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?</atitle><jtitle>European Union politics</jtitle><date>2009-12</date><risdate>2009</risdate><volume>10</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>507</spage><epage>534</epage><pages>507-534</pages><issn>1465-1165</issn><eissn>1741-2757</eissn><abstract>Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.</abstract><cop>London, England</cop><pub>SAGE Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/1465116509346780</doi><tpages>28</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1465-1165
ispartof European Union politics, 2009-12, Vol.10 (4), p.507-534
issn 1465-1165
1741-2757
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60517481
source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SAGE Complete
subjects Commissions
Consensus
Council of Ministers
Decision making
Europe
European Commission
European Union
Governance
Legislative Process
Member states
Policy Reform
Political Power
States (Political Subdivisions)
Veto
Voting Behavior
Voting behaviour
title Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T05%3A18%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Why%20Don%E2%80%99t%20Veto%20Players%20Use%20Their%20Power?&rft.jtitle=European%20Union%20politics&rft.au=K%C3%B6nig,%20Thomas&rft.date=2009-12&rft.volume=10&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=507&rft.epage=534&rft.pages=507-534&rft.issn=1465-1165&rft.eissn=1741-2757&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346780&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E37218214%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=37218214&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_sage_id=10.1177_1465116509346780&rfr_iscdi=true