Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation

Despite its failure to control the national debt, Congress continues to enact statutory limits on federal borrowing. The history of this practice and some reasons why it is still pursued are discussed. Since 1917, statutory debt limits have played a role in federal borrowing, congressional oversight, and the legislative process. However, statutory debt limits enacted by Congress have not only failed to curtail the government's growing deficit, but they have become a vehicle for expanding federal programs and expenditures. Despite the fact that outside experts have consistently reported to Congress that the debt limit is ineffective at curbing borrowing, Congress still clings to the practice. An examination of 57 debt ceiling increases since 1945 show that these votes have served Congress' needs in other ways. Goals have evolved to reflect changes in legislative institutions, the relationship between Congress and the executive, and norms within Congress. These goals are identified as: 1. managerial concerns: control of spending and oversight, 2. clarifying partisan and ideological differences on economic policy, and 3. exploitation of debt ceiling's must-pass status as a vehicle for other legislation. While events since 1987 suggest that Congress is turning away from statutory debt limitation as an effective policy, it has still not disappeared.