The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Public choice 2005-07, Vol.125 (1/2), p.95-127
Hauptverfasser:	Finus, M, Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C, Ierland, E.C. van
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agreements Carbon dioxide emissions Climate Climate change Climate change policy Coalitions Cooperation Councils Decision Models Economic costs and benefits Electoral systems Emissions reduction Environmental Policy Environmental Protection Game theory Global warming Greenhouse effect Greenhouse gases International agreements International Alliances International Cooperation International Organizations International relations Majority voting Majority voting system Marginal abatement costs Membership Memberships Nash equilibrium Political stability Pollutant emissions Pollution control Public choice Stability Studies Success Voter behavior Voting behaviour
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