Network Constraints in EU Banking Regulation: The Capital Requirements Directive
The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public policy 2009-08, Vol.29 (2), p.179-200 |
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description | The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography. |
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Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0143-814X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1469-7815</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X09001068</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JPUPDE</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Bank regulation ; Banking ; Banking industry ; Banking legislation ; Banking regulation ; Basel Accord ; brokerage ; Brokerages ; Capital requirements ; Case studies ; Central banks ; Committees ; EU policy ; Europe ; European Union ; Financial services ; Governance ; International banking ; Investment banking ; Network analysis ; Policy Making ; Political influences ; Regulation ; Regulation of financial institutions ; Savings banks ; Securities markets ; Social network analysis ; Social Networks ; Topography</subject><ispartof>Journal of public policy, 2009-08, Vol.29 (2), p.179-200</ispartof><rights>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</rights><rights>Copyright 2009 Cambridge University Press</rights><rights>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c486t-a2a3ae09eabd11285fe8f112523c38858d59749ded71f9ec708b6600cfc912fb3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c486t-a2a3ae09eabd11285fe8f112523c38858d59749ded71f9ec708b6600cfc912fb3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40542337$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0143814X09001068/type/journal_article$$EHTML$$P50$$Gcambridge$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>164,314,776,780,799,12824,27843,27901,27902,55603,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Christopoulos, D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Quaglia, Lucia</creatorcontrib><title>Network Constraints in EU Banking Regulation: The Capital Requirements Directive</title><title>Journal of public policy</title><addtitle>J. Pub. Pol</addtitle><description>The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.</description><subject>Bank regulation</subject><subject>Banking</subject><subject>Banking industry</subject><subject>Banking legislation</subject><subject>Banking regulation</subject><subject>Basel Accord</subject><subject>brokerage</subject><subject>Brokerages</subject><subject>Capital requirements</subject><subject>Case studies</subject><subject>Central banks</subject><subject>Committees</subject><subject>EU policy</subject><subject>Europe</subject><subject>European Union</subject><subject>Financial services</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>International banking</subject><subject>Investment banking</subject><subject>Network analysis</subject><subject>Policy Making</subject><subject>Political influences</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Regulation of financial institutions</subject><subject>Savings banks</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Social network analysis</subject><subject>Social Networks</subject><subject>Topography</subject><issn>0143-814X</issn><issn>1469-7815</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkV1PFDEUhhsjiSv6A7wwmXDh3UDP9Ns7WRFIEL8gEm-a7syZtbuzM0vbQfn3drOEEA3xqid9nrd5m0PIK6D7QEEdfKPAmQZ-RQ2lQKV-QibApSmVBvGUTDa43PBn5HmMi-ywnJuQz-eYfg1hWUyHPqbgfJ9i4fvi6LI4dP3S9_PiK87HziU_9G-Li59YTN3aJ9fl--vRB1zhJvI-T3XyN_iC7LSui_jy7twllx-OLqYn5dmn49Ppu7Oy5lqm0lWOOaQG3awBqLRoUbd5EBWrmdZCN8IobhpsFLQGa0X1TEpK67Y2ULUztkvebN9dh-F6xJjsyscau871OIzRZrdiHPR_RaZAVZLzLO79JS6GMfT5ExaMENpwCVmCrVSHIcaArV0Hv3Lh1gK1m03YfzaRM6-3mUVMQ7gPcCp4xZjKvNxyHxP-vucuLK1UTAkrj7_Y7z_o-dUhpfZj9tldB7eaBd_M8UHTR1v8AZ_eooA</recordid><startdate>20090801</startdate><enddate>20090801</enddate><creator>Christopoulos, D.</creator><creator>Quaglia, Lucia</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88F</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M1Q</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20090801</creationdate><title>Network Constraints in EU Banking Regulation: The Capital Requirements Directive</title><author>Christopoulos, D. ; 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subjects | Bank regulation Banking Banking industry Banking legislation Banking regulation Basel Accord brokerage Brokerages Capital requirements Case studies Central banks Committees EU policy Europe European Union Financial services Governance International banking Investment banking Network analysis Policy Making Political influences Regulation Regulation of financial institutions Savings banks Securities markets Social network analysis Social Networks Topography |
title | Network Constraints in EU Banking Regulation: The Capital Requirements Directive |
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