Antisocial Security: The Puzzle of Beggar-Thy-Children Policies
The U.S. Social Security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents. After some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed, a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descend...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 2009-07, Vol.53 (3), p.710-725 |
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| container_title | American journal of political science |
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| creator | Grafstein, Robert |
| description | The U.S. Social Security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents. After some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed, a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of Social Security's future retrenchment. Incorporating elements of Tabellini's (2000) positive theory of Social Security and Bénabou and Ok's (2001) analysis of income mobility, the model identifies specific forces affecting this time-varying individual support for Social Security. These forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility, relative income level, and age. An ordered logit analysis of cumulative ANES data supports these hypotheses. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00396.x |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | American journal of political science, 2009-07, Vol.53 (3), p.710-725 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
| subjects | Age Altruism Endowments Government programmes Hypotheses Income Income mobility Income taxes Intergenerational Relations Mobility Optimal taxation Parents Payroll taxes Policy making Political science Political theory Politics Public Opinion Reforms Retirement Security Social policy Social Security Social Security benefits Social security tax Voters |
| title | Antisocial Security: The Puzzle of Beggar-Thy-Children Policies |
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