Demanding Information: Think Tanks and the US Congress
The recent growth in the formation of think tanks in the United States raises questions about their role in the democratic process. A theory of think-tank formation is pre here, which posits that committee debate creates incentives for legislators to seek research-based, policy-analytic information...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | British journal of political science 2009-04, Vol.39 (2), p.225-242 |
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| container_title | British journal of political science |
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| creator | Bertelli, Anthony M. Wenger, Jeffrey B. |
| description | The recent growth in the formation of think tanks in the United States raises questions about their role in the democratic process. A theory of think-tank formation is pre here, which posits that committee debate creates incentives for legislators to seek research-based, policy-analytic information supporting competing policy positions. As political entrepreneurs recognize this demand, they supply think tanks, just as scholars have suggested they supply interest groups. An important macro-level implication of this theory is that as legislators’ ideological polarization increases, the demand for policy analysis increases, as does the number of think tanks supplied. Empirical support for this proposition in the United States from 1903 to 2003 is shown, while controlling for market factors measuring the opportunity cost of investing in think tanks. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0007123408000410 |
| format | Article |
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J. Polit. Sci</addtitle><date>2009-04-01</date><risdate>2009</risdate><volume>39</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>225</spage><epage>242</epage><pages>225-242</pages><issn>0007-1234</issn><eissn>1469-2112</eissn><coden>BPLSBO</coden><abstract>The recent growth in the formation of think tanks in the United States raises questions about their role in the democratic process. A theory of think-tank formation is pre here, which posits that committee debate creates incentives for legislators to seek research-based, policy-analytic information supporting competing policy positions. As political entrepreneurs recognize this demand, they supply think tanks, just as scholars have suggested they supply interest groups. An important macro-level implication of this theory is that as legislators’ ideological polarization increases, the demand for policy analysis increases, as does the number of think tanks supplied. 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| ispartof | British journal of political science, 2009-04, Vol.39 (2), p.225-242 |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge Journals; Jstor Complete Legacy |
| subjects | Advocacy Bipolarization Competition Congressional committees Congressional elections Congressional investigations Cost benefit analysis Credibility Democracy Economic models Entrepreneurs Environmental law Estate taxes Government information Ideology Interest Groups Legislative Bodies Legislative process Legislators Lobbying Opportunity costs Parliamentarians Policy Policy analysis Policy research Political debate Political economy Political interest groups Political power Political science Political theory Politics Public policy Research biases Studies Suppliers Think Tanks U.S.A United States of America |
| title | Demanding Information: Think Tanks and the US Congress |
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