The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution
In this article, we investigate the dynamics of constitutional policy. Starting from the observation that federal systems are confronted with a two-sided dilemma of stability and flexibility, the question is how necessary constitutional change can be accomplished in spite of special rules of amendme...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Publius 2009-04, Vol.39 (2), p.213-240 |
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| creator | Behnke, Nathalie Benz, Arthur |
| description | In this article, we investigate the dynamics of constitutional policy. Starting from the observation that federal systems are confronted with a two-sided dilemma of stability and flexibility, the question is how necessary constitutional change can be accomplished in spite of special rules of amendment and numerous veto players. We propose an analytical distinction of reform and evolution as two modes of constitutional change that can complement and in part substitute for each other. Comparative research shows that those two modes can effectively account for different patterns of constitutional change and that a two-track mode of constitutional change making use of a flexible interplay of both reform and evolution can best secure federal stability over the long run. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/publius/pjn039 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Publius, 2009-04, Vol.39 (2), p.213-240 |
| issn | 0048-5950 1747-7107 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Amendments Change Comparative Analysis Constitutional amendments Constitutional change Constitutional reform Constitutions Evolution Federalism Government Government reform Intergovernmental relations Intergovernmentalism Parliamentary system Parliaments Policy Reform Political conflict Political reform Political stability Politics Power relations Social evolution Society Stability Studies Veto |
| title | The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution |
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