Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence
Mancur Olson's theory of the decline of nations is path-breaking in political economics. It has been tested cross-sectionally in numerous empirical studies. We survey the existing results briefly, with a special focus on studies using the number of lobbies as an exogenous variable. Using data f...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2009-03, Vol.138 (3/4), p.301-315 |
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| creator | Horgos, Daniel Zimmermann, Klaus W. |
| description | Mancur Olson's theory of the decline of nations is path-breaking in political economics. It has been tested cross-sectionally in numerous empirical studies. We survey the existing results briefly, with a special focus on studies using the number of lobbies as an exogenous variable. Using data from the period 1973–2006, we then present the field's first time-series analysis of the effects of the number of interest groups on the German lobby list and macroeconomic performance, gauged in terms of economic growth and inflation. The number of interest groups (as a proxy for their influence) is shown to have an important impact on macro-variables: Interest group activity significantly leads to a decline in the growth rate and a rise in the inflation rate. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-008-9360-4 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Competition Cross-sectional analysis Economic Conditions Economic Development Economic growth Economic growth models Economic growth rate Economic growth theories Economic models Economic performance Economics Economics and Finance Germany Gross domestic product Growth rate Growth rates Inflation Inflation rate Inflation rates Interest Groups Lobbying Macroeconomics Political economy Political interest groups Political Science Politics Public Finance Society Special interest groups Studies Time series |
| title | Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence |
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