Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies
We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American political science review 2008-05, Vol.102 (2), p.169-180 |
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| creator | HUBER, JOHN D. MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, CECILIA |
| description | We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue that to explain patterns of individual stability, it is useful to focus on the problems that party leaders have in identifying which individuals have the qualities necessary to do their jobs well. The institutional powers of ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables should affect the uncertainty that party leaders have about which individuals will be successful ministers, on one hand, and the ability of party leaders to replace unsuccessful ministers, on the other. Our empirical tests support these arguments. The analysis therefore has implications for expectations regarding the circumstances under which minister stability should positively or negatively influence the policymaking performance of government. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S000305540808012X |
| format | Article |
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Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue that to explain patterns of individual stability, it is useful to focus on the problems that party leaders have in identifying which individuals have the qualities necessary to do their jobs well. The institutional powers of ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables should affect the uncertainty that party leaders have about which individuals will be successful ministers, on one hand, and the ability of party leaders to replace unsuccessful ministers, on the other. Our empirical tests support these arguments. 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Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue that to explain patterns of individual stability, it is useful to focus on the problems that party leaders have in identifying which individuals have the qualities necessary to do their jobs well. The institutional powers of ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables should affect the uncertainty that party leaders have about which individuals will be successful ministers, on one hand, and the ability of party leaders to replace unsuccessful ministers, on the other. Our empirical tests support these arguments. The analysis therefore has implications for expectations regarding the circumstances under which minister stability should positively or negatively influence the policymaking performance of government.</abstract><cop>New York, USA</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/S000305540808012X</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record> |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Jstor Complete Legacy; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
| subjects | Adverse selection Appointments & personnel changes Cabinet Cabinets Coalition governments Democracy Governance Government Government (Administrative Body) Government cabinets Government failure Influence Leaders Legislative Bodies Ministers Ministers (Political) Moral hazard Moral hazard models Parliamentary government Parliamentary system Parliaments Party politics Political culture Political parties Political science Politics Prime ministers Stability Success Survival analysis Tax Rates Terminations |
| title | Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies |
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