The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in se...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of political science 2008-07, Vol.52 (3), p.504-519
Hauptverfasser:	Staton, Jeffrey K., Vanberg, Georg
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Compliance costs Court costs Decision making Decision theory Delegation of authority Game theory Government bureaucracy Guideline adherence Judges Judges & magistrates Judicial review Judicial rulings Judiciary Law Legal norms Legal systems Legislators Legislatures Opinion Opinions Political science Public policy Social norms Supreme Court
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