Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway
Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on mobility of tax base and tax levels, while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments m...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2007-09, Vol.132 (3/4), p.457-470 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Fiva, Jon H. Rattsø, Jørn |
| description | Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on mobility of tax base and tax levels, while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments make a discrete choice whether to have property tax. The local choice is investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. Our results indicate that yardstick competition explains the distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation observed. Grants have no effect on the propensity to have property taxation, consistent with the flypaper effect. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-007-9171-z |
| format | Article |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Bayesian method Choices Commercial real estate Competition Councils Decision Making Econometrics Economic competition Electricity distribution Fiscal policy Government grants Impact analysis Income taxes Local government Modeling Municipalities Norway Performance evaluation Political economy Political parties Politics Property Property taxes Socialism Spatial models State court decisions Studies Tax base Tax rates Tax revenues Taxation Urban areas Voters |
| title | Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway |
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