Party Politics and Fiscal Discipline in a Federation: Evidence from the States of India

Theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that federations are prone to fiscal indiscipline, because of intergovernmental bargaining over the allocation of national resources. What role do political parties play in mediating this bargain? If the national government is dominated by a single politic...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Comparative political studies 2007-06, Vol.40 (6), p.691-712
1. Verfasser:	Khemani, Stuti
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Allocation Bargaining Budget deficit Budget deficits Central government Coalition governments Coalitions Comparative politics Development policy Discipline Economic instability Federalism Federations Fiscal policy India Macroeconomics Party politics Policy analysis Political Parties Political power Political science Politics Power Prone Public Debt Resource allocation States (Political Subdivisions)
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