Presidential Republics and Divided Government: Lawmaking and Executive Politics in the United States and France

Richard S. Conley compares the impact of institutional prerogatives and informal resources available to American and French presidents in their quest to manage legislative outcomes under split-party control of national institutions in each country. Adapted from the source document.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Political science quarterly 2007-06, Vol.122 (2), p.257-285
1. Verfasser:	CONLEY, RICHARD S.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Blame Case studies Cohabitation Comparative analysis Comparative government Comparative studies Constitutional law Democracy Divided Government Executive branch Executive power Executive-legislative relations France France - President - Powers and duties Government Institutions Intergovernmental relations Law Legislation Legislative process Legislatures Parliamentary system Parliaments Policy making Political analysis Political aspects Political leadership Political power Political rhetoric Political science Politics Presidency Presidents Prime ministers Public opinion Speakers of the House Strategic aspects Strategic management United States - President - Powers and duties United States of America United States Senate Veto
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Richard S. Conley compares the impact of institutional prerogatives and informal resources available to American and French presidents in their quest to manage legislative outcomes under split-party control of national institutions in each country. Adapted from the source document.
ISSN:	0032-3195 1538-165X
DOI:	10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00599.x