Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000

Does congressional opposition constrain the president's conflict behavior in response to poor economic performance? Other research has shown that legislative constraints such as divided government reduce the executive's propensity to initiate conflict. But institutional constraints on demo...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of conflict resolution 2006-08, Vol.50 (4), p.463-483
1. Verfasser:	Brule, David
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Armed forces Coalition governments Conflict Conflict resolution Democracy Economic conditions Economic legislation Economic models Economic performance Economic Problems Foreign policy Government Government (Administrative Body) Government policy Gross domestic product Heads of state Hypotheses Intergovernmental Relations International disputes International relations Leaders Leadership Legislation Legislative Bodies Legislatures Members of Parliament Military Intervention Parliaments Political behavior Political leadership Political opposition Political parties Political partisanship Political Power Post World War II Period Presidents Studies U.S.A
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