Term Limits and Pork

We describe a model of electoral selection and legislative policy choice that explores the effects of term limits on legislative spending. In the model, self-interested voters in a collection of districts prefer representatives who deliver pork over representatives who maximize aggregate social welf...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Legislative studies quarterly 2006-08, Vol.31 (3), p.383-403
Hauptverfasser:	HERRON, MICHAEL C., SHOTTS, KENNETH W.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Congressional voting Districts Expenditures Government spending Incentives Incumbents Legislators Legislatures Modeling Patronage Pork Social Welfare Term Limits Voters Voting Voting behavior Voting precincts
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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