RIVALROUS CONSONANCE AND THE POWER STRUCTURE OF OPEC
SUMMARY At the theoretical level the development of a useful theory of oligopoly depends upon the ability to translate industrial power structure into quantitative form with sufficient mathematical uniqueness to permit incorporation into functions. More practically, understanding the decision proces...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Kyklos (Basel) 1979-01, Vol.32 (4), p.695-717 |
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| container_title | Kyklos (Basel) |
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| creator | Kuenne, Robert E. |
| description | SUMMARY
At the theoretical level the development of a useful theory of oligopoly depends upon the ability to translate industrial power structure into quantitative form with sufficient mathematical uniqueness to permit incorporation into functions. More practically, understanding the decision processes of the OPEC cartel benefits greatly from an isolation of the pairwise power relations among its members. This paper develops a general technique for the measurement of the combination of rivalry and cooperation that characterizes the relations of oligopolistic industries, and applies it to the derivation of power measures for 11 members of OPEC taken pairwise. It hopes thereby to capture both general and market relationships that underlie the power each member has in decision making for the cartel. In future work these factors will be incorporated in a nonlinear programming model of the pricing policies of the cartel. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1979.tb01141.x |
| format | Article |
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At the theoretical level the development of a useful theory of oligopoly depends upon the ability to translate industrial power structure into quantitative form with sufficient mathematical uniqueness to permit incorporation into functions. More practically, understanding the decision processes of the OPEC cartel benefits greatly from an isolation of the pairwise power relations among its members. This paper develops a general technique for the measurement of the combination of rivalry and cooperation that characterizes the relations of oligopolistic industries, and applies it to the derivation of power measures for 11 members of OPEC taken pairwise. It hopes thereby to capture both general and market relationships that underlie the power each member has in decision making for the cartel. In future work these factors will be incorporated in a nonlinear programming model of the pricing policies of the cartel.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0023-5962</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-6435</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1979.tb01141.x</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Organization of petroleum exporting countries</subject><ispartof>Kyklos (Basel), 1979-01, Vol.32 (4), p.695-717</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5685-be1b0a826edab628f06af6f7a24686263e649be66d21dffd326ec979633009653</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c5685-be1b0a826edab628f06af6f7a24686263e649be66d21dffd326ec979633009653</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fj.1467-6435.1979.tb01141.x$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fj.1467-6435.1979.tb01141.x$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,4008,27865,27869,27924,27925,45574,45575</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/blakyklos/v_3a32_3ay_3a1979_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a695-717.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kuenne, Robert E.</creatorcontrib><title>RIVALROUS CONSONANCE AND THE POWER STRUCTURE OF OPEC</title><title>Kyklos (Basel)</title><description>SUMMARY
At the theoretical level the development of a useful theory of oligopoly depends upon the ability to translate industrial power structure into quantitative form with sufficient mathematical uniqueness to permit incorporation into functions. More practically, understanding the decision processes of the OPEC cartel benefits greatly from an isolation of the pairwise power relations among its members. This paper develops a general technique for the measurement of the combination of rivalry and cooperation that characterizes the relations of oligopolistic industries, and applies it to the derivation of power measures for 11 members of OPEC taken pairwise. It hopes thereby to capture both general and market relationships that underlie the power each member has in decision making for the cartel. 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At the theoretical level the development of a useful theory of oligopoly depends upon the ability to translate industrial power structure into quantitative form with sufficient mathematical uniqueness to permit incorporation into functions. More practically, understanding the decision processes of the OPEC cartel benefits greatly from an isolation of the pairwise power relations among its members. This paper develops a general technique for the measurement of the combination of rivalry and cooperation that characterizes the relations of oligopolistic industries, and applies it to the derivation of power measures for 11 members of OPEC taken pairwise. It hopes thereby to capture both general and market relationships that underlie the power each member has in decision making for the cartel. In future work these factors will be incorporated in a nonlinear programming model of the pricing policies of the cartel.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1467-6435.1979.tb01141.x</doi><tpages>23</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Kyklos (Basel), 1979-01, Vol.32 (4), p.695-717 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Wiley Journals; PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Organization of petroleum exporting countries |
| title | RIVALROUS CONSONANCE AND THE POWER STRUCTURE OF OPEC |
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