An Argument concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes
Cross references in belief sentences are examined. Sentences like Hollie thinks there is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that is worth going back to are attributions of de dicto belief. Sentences like There is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that Hollie thinks is worth going back to attribute...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophical studies 1987-03, Vol.51 (2), p.145-168 |
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| container_title | Philosophical studies |
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| creator | TIENSON, J. L |
| description | Cross references in belief sentences are examined. Sentences like Hollie thinks there is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that is worth going back to are attributions of de dicto belief. Sentences like There is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that Hollie thinks is worth going back to attribute de re belief, or involve "quantifying in" a belief context about a particular thing. An argument is outlined to show that an existential generalization on singular terms in belief contexts is not a valid mode of inference. Based on this argument, it is further claimed that there is no sound argument from a de dicto premise to the corresponding de re belief attribution. Thus, there is no sound argument that would take Hollie thinks Grand Fortune Garden is worth going back to as its premise & the second sentence above as its conclusion. From this it is further concluded that all de re belief attributions are false. B. Annesser Murray |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF00353645 |
| format | Article |
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L</creator><creatorcontrib>TIENSON, J. L</creatorcontrib><description>Cross references in belief sentences are examined. Sentences like Hollie thinks there is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that is worth going back to are attributions of de dicto belief. Sentences like There is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that Hollie thinks is worth going back to attribute de re belief, or involve "quantifying in" a belief context about a particular thing. An argument is outlined to show that an existential generalization on singular terms in belief contexts is not a valid mode of inference. Based on this argument, it is further claimed that there is no sound argument from a de dicto premise to the corresponding de re belief attribution. Thus, there is no sound argument that would take Hollie thinks Grand Fortune Garden is worth going back to as its premise & the second sentence above as its conclusion. From this it is further concluded that all de re belief attributions are false. B. 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From this it is further concluded that all de re belief attributions are false. B. Annesser Murray</description><subject>Belief</subject><subject>Geometric shapes</subject><subject>Inference</subject><subject>Janitors</subject><subject>Linguistics</subject><subject>Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language</subject><subject>Philosophical object</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Philosophy of language. 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L</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>An Argument concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes</atitle><jtitle>Philosophical studies</jtitle><date>1987-03-01</date><risdate>1987</risdate><volume>51</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>145</spage><epage>168</epage><pages>145-168</pages><issn>0031-8116</issn><eissn>1573-0883</eissn><coden>PLSDA3</coden><abstract>Cross references in belief sentences are examined. Sentences like Hollie thinks there is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that is worth going back to are attributions of de dicto belief. Sentences like There is a Chinese restaurant in New Jersey that Hollie thinks is worth going back to attribute de re belief, or involve "quantifying in" a belief context about a particular thing. An argument is outlined to show that an existential generalization on singular terms in belief contexts is not a valid mode of inference. Based on this argument, it is further claimed that there is no sound argument from a de dicto premise to the corresponding de re belief attribution. Thus, there is no sound argument that would take Hollie thinks Grand Fortune Garden is worth going back to as its premise & the second sentence above as its conclusion. From this it is further concluded that all de re belief attributions are false. B. Annesser Murray</abstract><cop>Heidelberg</cop><pub>D. Reidel Publishing Company</pub><doi>10.1007/BF00353645</doi><tpages>24</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Philosophical studies, 1987-03, Vol.51 (2), p.145-168 |
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| source | Springer Online Journals Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Belief Geometric shapes Inference Janitors Linguistics Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language Philosophical object Philosophy Philosophy of language. Logic Propositional attitudes Quantification Singular terms Skepticism Truth |
| title | An Argument concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes |
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