Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance

Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to empty strategy sets. If best replies are well-defined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot appear; if strategy sp...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2002-09, Vol.70 (5), p.2007-2023
Hauptverfasser:	Dufwenberg, Martin, Stegeman, Mark
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applications Applied sciences Cooperation Econometrics Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Equilibrium existence conditions Exact sciences and technology existence Game theory Games Hausdorff spaces Insurance, economics, finance iterated elimination Mathematical sequences Mathematics maximal reduction Nash equilibrium Nonexistence Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Operations research order independence Pathology Pay-off Probability and statistics Sciences and techniques of general use Statistics strict dominance Studies Topological theorems Treaties Uniqueness
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!