State Tax and Policy Competition For Mobile Capital
We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic record 2002-06, Vol.78 (241), p.175-185 |
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| container_title | The Economic record |
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| creator | Petchey, Jeffrey D. Shapiro, Perry |
| description | We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality generated by capital. It is also argued that competition between states leads to an inefficient supply and geographical distribution of capital within the domestic economy if capital markets are not fully integrated. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1475-4932.00049 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0013-0249 |
| ispartof | The Economic record, 2002-06, Vol.78 (241), p.175-185 |
| issn | 0013-0249 1475-4932 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Capital Capital market Capital markets Competition Economic models Economics Efficiency Equilibrium Fiscal policy Infrastructure Labour Politics Public good Regional development Regional economics State taxes Statistical analysis Studies Subsidies Tax competition |
| title | State Tax and Policy Competition For Mobile Capital |
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