Market power and banking failures

We investigate whether more competition in the banking industry necessarily results in a higher probability of banking failures, as it is often suggested. In our model borrowers face a moral hazard problem, which induces banks to choose between costly monitoring and credit rationing. We show that in...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of industrial organization 2002-11, Vol.20 (9), p.1341-1361
Hauptverfasser:	Caminal, Ramon, Matutes, Carmen
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bank failures Banking Banking failures Banking industry Competition Credit rationing Economic models Failure Industrial organization Market power Monitoring Moral hazard Organization theory Risk Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!