Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game

This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interaction between an optimizing government and the private sector. Two polar cases are considered: (a) the private sector is represented by a single agent; and (b) there is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents. In both cases, the...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic dynamics & control 2002-08, Vol.26 (9), p.1457-1479
Hauptverfasser:	Deissenberg, Christophe, Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cheating Credibility Economic control Economic dynamics Economic policy Game theory Government Kydland–Prescott model Macroeconomic policy Macroeconomic policy-making Macroeconomics Optimal cheating strategies Policy making Private sector Reinforcement learning Reputation Reversed Stackelberg games Studies Time inconsistency
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