Conflict and Survival in Triads

Conflict and Survival in Triads

A study of conflictive behavior in a three-person laboratory game provided support for five hypotheses or principles of survival in multipolar power systems: (1) the probability of survival is maximized by having as much or more power than the combination of all potential enemies; (2) if such hegemo...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of conflict resolution 1976-12, Vol.20 (4), p.589-608
Hauptverfasser: Hartman, E. Alan, Phillips, James L., Cole, Steven G.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Analysis of variance
Armed conflict
Conflict resolution
Dictators
Dyadic relations
Game theory
methods and research techniques
Motivation research
Political science
Power structures
Social psychology
Statistical variance
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container_issue 4
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container_title The Journal of conflict resolution
container_volume 20
creator Hartman, E. Alan
Phillips, James L.
Cole, Steven G.
description A study of conflictive behavior in a three-person laboratory game provided support for five hypotheses or principles of survival in multipolar power systems: (1) the probability of survival is maximized by having as much or more power than the combination of all potential enemies; (2) if such hegemony is not possible, the probability of survival increases and conflict decreases following a transition from a multipolar to a bipolar power system; (3) disparity of power tends to increase conflict and reduce survival probabilities; (4) if power hegemony does not exist, survival is inversely related to power; and (5) aggressive (as opposed to pacific) behavior is positively related to survival. In addition, the conflict process was found to be a function of both structural and motivational factors.
doi_str_mv 10.1177/002200277602000402
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source Access via SAGE; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing
subjects Analysis of variance
Armed conflict
Conflict resolution
Dictators
Dyadic relations
Game theory
methods and research techniques
Motivation research
Political science
Power structures
Social psychology
Statistical variance
title Conflict and Survival in Triads
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