The information advantage in two-person bargaining with incomplete information

The sealed-bid k-double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. In the process of testing whether or not the observed bid and ask functions are in agreement with the Bayesian linear equilibrium solution under asymmetric information condit...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic behavior & organization 2001-02, Vol.44 (2), p.177-200
Hauptverfasser:	Seale, Darryl A., Daniel, Terry E., Rapoport, Amnon
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Auctions Bargaining Bayesian analysis Bilateral bargaining Economic behaviour Economic models Economic organization Economic theory Imperfect information Information disparity Learning Reinforcement-based learning Sealed-bid k-double auction Studies Uncertainty
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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